Clubs Association Agreements

1. Introduction

The modern sports industry is becoming increasingly institutionalized due to its high revenue and brand value potential; in this process, coordination, representation, and shared interests among clubs are becoming inevitable. In Turkey, the Clubs Union Foundation , the umbrella organization for football clubs , is the most important structure institutionalizing this cooperation. However, the fact that clubs act together as actors in the same market constitutes a serious "cartel risk" under Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition

This article will examine in detail the status of inter-club cooperation agreements in competition law, their nature as "decisions of an undertaking," the criteria for suspected cartels, and the importance of compliance programs.

---

2. Legal Status of the Clubs Association

The Clubs Association Foundationis a private legal entity, established in the 2000s by the Super League clubs coming together.
Its purpose is to protect the common interests of the clubs, provide representation before the Turkish Football Federation (TFF), and establish a joint decision-making mechanism for the distribution of league revenues.

However, according to Article 3 of Law No. 4054, any structure engaged in economic activity is considered an "undertaking," and any platform formed by such an entity is considered an "undertaking association." Therefore, the Clubs Association is fully subject to the oversight of competition law. The decisions taken by the Association can be examined within the scope of Article 4 of the Law .

---

3. "Suspicion of Cartel" within the Scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054

3.1. Prohibition of Decisions of the Enterprise Association

Article 4 of Law No. 4054 prohibits "the anti-competitive, distorting, or restrictive effects of decisions made by associations of undertakings." This applies
when clubs come together to:

• Broadcasting rights prices,

• Player transfer policies,

• Sponsorship or licensing revenues,

• Fan merchandise prices,

• Determining issues such as the foreign player limit together,

This could have a competition-eliminating effect.

In this case, the Competition Board the decisions taken by the Clubs Association on suspicion of cartel activity.

3.2. Signs of Suspicion of a Cartel

The indicators that raise suspicion of a cartel are as follows:

1. Price or fee coordination (e.g., reaching an agreement on a player salary cap),

2. Market sharing (e.g., sponsorship areas),

3. Customer sharing (fan base or broadcaster distribution),

4. A common stance during the transfer period,

5. A joint pressure mechanism to influence TFF decisions.

These situations fall into the category of clear and serious violations within the meaning of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 .

---

4. The EU Competition Law Approach

In European Union law, decisions taken by clubs under the umbrella of the association are also TFEU article 101 .

4.1. UEFA and ECA Examples

UEFA and the European Club Association (ECA) were audited by the European Commission in 2009 and 2015.
The Commission stated that such associations could coordinate for sporting purposes, but:

• In commercial areas (e.g., sponsorship, broadcasting rights, ticket prices)

• that decisions restricting competition should be avoided,
  otherwise a joint venture .

4.2. CJEU Case Law

In the Wouters Judgment (C-309/99) and the Meca-Medina Judgment (C-519/04 P) , the CJEU stated that the restrictive effect of "regulatory association decisions" on competition should be assessed through a proportionality test. Decisions of the Clubs Association should also pass this test.

• Is the aim legitimate? (The balance of the league organization)

• Is the vehicle suitable? (Is coordination required?)

• Is the restriction proportionate? (Is there an alternative, less restrictive method?)

If these three criteria are not met, the decisions are considered a cartel.

---

5. Turkish Practice and Competition Board Decisions

The Competition Board has conducted various investigations into the Turkish sports sector to date.
Some notable examples are:

1. TFF Broadcasting Rights Decision (2008/32-421-147):
   Although the TFF's monopolistic sale of broadcasting rights was deemed "restrictive to competition," it was exempted on the grounds that it ensured fairness in revenue sharing .

2. Spor Toto Super League Sponsorship Decision (2014/06-82-30):
   Clubs were warned against negotiating joint sponsorship deals on the grounds that it "carries a cartel risk."

3. E-Sports League Decision (2021/07-106): The creation of a shared prize pool among teams has been accepted as a proportionate restriction as it equalizes income .
   

As these examples show, the Board draws a fine line between "sporting-related coordination" and "commercial cartel.".

---

6. Areas of Activity and Risk Zones of the Clubs Association

The legitimate activities of the Clubs Association and the areas that carry the risk of cartel formation can be distinguished as follows:

This distinction is made according to the criteria of "purpose" and "effect".
In terms of competition law, regardless of how legitimate the purpose may be, if its effect restricts competition .

---

7. The Importance of Compliance Programs

The Association of Clubs and its member clubs need to establish an effective competition law compliance program to minimize the risk of cartels . The Competition Authority's 2020 Compliance Guide provides guidance in this regard.

7.1. Elements That Should Be Included in the Adaptation Program

1. Education and Awareness:
   Club managers and legal departments should receive regular training on competition law.

2. Meeting Monitoring:
   Sharing competitive and sensitive information (price, salary, transfer targets, etc.) should be prohibited at Club Association meetings.

3. Internal Audit Mechanism:
   A system of transparency, information sharing, and record-keeping should be established.

4. Independent Legal Advice:
   Competition law opinions should be sought before every decision.

5. Disciplinary Sanctions:
   Internal disciplinary sanctions should be foreseen for clubs that violate the rules.

7.2. Legal Outcome of the Harmonization Program

The Competition Board may apply penalty reductions to undertakings that implement an effective compliance program (Guideline No. 2020/2). Therefore, integrating such a program into the Clubs Association's internal regulations would be a "demonstration of good faith" in potential investigations.

---

8. CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sport) and Clubs Association Decisions

CAS does not directly investigate cartels; however, it can rule on cases where coordination between clubs violates "fair competition."
For example, CAS 2015/A/4162 (FC Sion v. UEFA) , UEFA's decision to ban a club from the tournament by association was found to be "proportionate" because the aim was to protect sporting integrity.
In contrast, CAS 2008/A/1572 , decisions by association were overturned in cases where they created discrimination.

Consequently, CAS considers the decisions of club associations legitimate only on sporting grounds . Economic or anti-competitive grounds are unlawful.

---

9. Harmonization of Competition Law with the Harmonization Programme

The nature of sport (lex sportiva) and the commercial dynamics of competition law can sometimes conflict.
To reconcile these two systems:

• Transparent decision-making processes,

• Independent ethics committee,

• EU-compliant regulatory mechanisms,

• Consultation protocols with the Competition Authority

These steps are necessary.

Indeed, UEFA and ECA formalized these principles in 2022 with a document called the " Integrity and Competition Integrity Charter ". A similar "Competition Compliance Code" should be created within the Clubs Association in Turkey.

---

10. Conclusion and Evaluation

While club association agreements address the need for coordination in the sports economy, they also create a risky area from the perspective of competition law . Decisions made under Article 4 of Law No. 4054 raise suspicions of cartels if they affect economic parameters (price, wages, transfers, etc.) . However, coordinations aimed at maintaining league order and balancing sporting competition are lawful when proportionality tests and exemption conditions are met

To enable the Turkish sports sector to comply with international competition norms, a competition law compliance program should be made mandatory at the level of the Clubs Association.
This will both reduce the risk of penalties from the Competition Authority and increase the institutional credibility of Turkish football.