Blue Homeland and Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Areas: Legal Debates from the Perspective of International Maritime Law

Entrance

Turkey is a coastal state bordering the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, controlling the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, and situated at the intersection of maritime transport routes. The scope of Türkiye's maritime rights is significant not only for national security but also for energy resources, fisheries, maritime transport, submarine cables, scientific research, environmental protection, and the exploitation of natural resources.

In recent years, the concept of "Blue Homeland" has been used to encompass all of Türkiye's rights and interests in the seas. This concept represents a strategic approach to protecting Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean Sea, to evaluating marine resources, and to developing its naval power. However, "Blue Homeland" is not a technical maritime area defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or any other international agreement. The concept itself does not, by itself, confer sovereignty or sovereign rights. Türkiye's maritime powers are determined through areas recognized by international law, such as internal waters, territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone.

Therefore, when evaluating the legality of the Blue Homeland doctrine, rather than focusing on political or military rhetoric, one should examine the powers of coastal states over their maritime areas, delimitation principles, the impact of islands on maritime areas, equity, proportionality, the geography of reciprocal coasts, and agreements concluded between the relevant states. Türkiye's non-participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not end the evaluation. While Turkey is not a party to the Convention, it is bound by customary rules of maritime law; however, it cannot be accepted that all provisions of the Convention create contractual obligations for it. In a notification submitted to the United Nations in 2026, Turkey explicitly stated that it maintains its status as a non-party to the UNCLOS.

The Legal Nature of the Blue Homeland Concept

The Blue Homeland is primarily a geopolitical and strategic doctrine. It envisages the protection of Türkiye's sovereignty, sovereign rights, and legitimate economic interests in the seas as a whole. In this respect, the concept is based on the idea that Türkiye is not only limited to its land territory; the surrounding maritime areas are also of vital importance in terms of security, economy, and foreign policy.

However, the use of the word "homeland" does not mean that all maritime areas referred to as the Blue Homeland are under Türkiye's sovereignty, like its land territory or territorial waters. In international maritime law, the nature of the powers a coastal state possesses in different maritime areas differs. Internal waters and territorial waters are part of the state's territory. In contrast, in the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, the coastal state does not exercise territorial sovereignty, but rather "sovereign rights" and "jurisdiction" limited to specific matters.

This distinction is extremely important legally. Turkey may have exclusive rights to explore and exploit natural resources on the seabed and subsoil within its continental shelf; however, it cannot close off the waters above this area as if they were its territorial waters. Similarly, in the exclusive economic zone, while the coastal state has special powers regarding natural resources, artificial islands, environmental protection, and scientific research, other states retain freedom of navigation, flights, and the laying of underwater cables and pipelines. Articles 55 to 58 of the UNCLOS concerning the exclusive economic zone establish this balance between the rights of the coastal state and the freedoms of other states.

Therefore, the Blue Homeland concept should not be interpreted as Turkey claiming territorial ownership of the seas; rather, it should be interpreted as a policy aimed at protecting Türkiye's diverse maritime jurisdictions stemming from international law. The legal boundaries of the concept are the limits of the areas recognized by international maritime law.

General Legal Framework of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas

The maritime powers of a coastal state change as it moves away from the coast. The areas where a state's sovereignty is strongest are its internal and territorial waters. It has the authority to monitor and enforce specific laws in the contiguous zone. The continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone are areas where sovereign rights are exercised with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities.

Maritime zones are defined by baselines. The standard baseline is, as a rule, the lowest tide line along the coast. For indented coastlines, bays, islands, and harbor structures, either a straight baseline or a special baseline method may be applied. A state's territorial waters, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone are measured from these baselines.

If the width of the maritime areas is insufficient between states with adjacent or contiguous coastlines, the maximum maritime zones that states can claim will overlap. In this case, neither coastal state can automatically invoke the maximum distance it has declared in its domestic law against the other state. Overlapping areas must be determined by a delimitation agreement in accordance with international law or by a judicial method based on the consent of the parties.

The fundamental aim in delimiting maritime zones is not a mathematically equal distribution, but rather to achieve an equitable outcome. Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS, concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, stipulate that states with opposite or adjacent coasts should reach an agreement to achieve an equitable solution. In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, a three-stage method has been developed in practice, mostly involving the establishment of a provisional equidistant line, its correction due to relevant circumstances, and the verification of whether the result creates a clear disproportion in terms of coastal lengths. However, the Court also emphasizes that this method cannot be applied mechanically and independently of geographical conditions.

Türkiye's Inland Waters and Territorial Waters

Internal waters are the sea areas that lie on the land side of the baseline. Ports, certain bays, and, depending on the nature of the coastline, sea areas behind the baseline may be considered internal waters. The coastal state exercises extensive sovereignty in internal waters similar to that in its mainland territory. The right of foreign vessels to enter internal waters and ports is not a general right except through treaties or special permits.

Territorial waters are the part of a coastal state's territory that extends into the sea. The sovereignty of a coastal state extends over the water body, seabed, subsoil, and airspace above its territorial waters. While foreign vessels have the right of innocent passage, this right does not override the sovereignty of the coastal state.

Article 3 of the UNCLOS grants states the right to define their territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. However, this provision does not mean that any state can unilaterally use the 12-mile area in every geographical situation without considering the rights of other coastal states. The need for delimitation continues in seas where there are opposing or adjacent coasts and insufficient distance.

According to Law No. 2674 on Territorial Waters in Türkiye, the general width of Turkish territorial waters is six nautical miles. The President is authorized to determine a width exceeding six nautical miles, taking into account the characteristics of specific seas and the principle of equity. Turkey applies a 12-nautical-mile territorial water limit in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, and a six-nautical-mile limit in the Aegean Sea.

Continental Shelf

The continental shelf is the maritime area based on the natural underwater extension of the coastal state's land territory, granting sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil natural resources. According to the system outlined in Article 76 of the UNCLOS, the continental shelf can extend along the natural extension of the coastal state's land territory to the outer limit of the continental margin, or, if closer, up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. In seas where coasts are close together, delimitation is necessary due to the potential overlap of rights.

Rights in the continental shelf arise automatically and from the outset. The coastal state does not need to make a separate declaration or actually occupy the area. The state has exclusive rights to explore and exploit oil, natural gas, and other non-living resources, as well as marine life dependent on the seabed, in the continental shelf. No other state or company may drill without the express permission of the coastal state. The UNCLOS also grants the coastal state exclusive rights to authorize and regulate all types of drilling in the continental shelf.

The legal regime of the continental shelf does not alter the status of the body of water above it. The continental shelf may be subject to either an offshore or exclusive economic zone regime. Therefore, continental shelf rights do not grant the authority to prevent foreign merchant vessels from passing through the area.

One of Türkiye's most important legal claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean is that the natural underwater extension of the Anatolian coast and its long mainland coastline cannot be ignored in delimitation. Turkey argues that it would be unfair to deprive the mainland coastline of significant maritime areas by granting full effect to islands located directly in front of the opposite coast.

Exclusive Economic Zone

The exclusive economic zone is a special maritime area extending beyond and adjacent to territorial waters, and extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. The coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the living and non-living natural resources in this area, including the water mass, seabed, and subsoil. It also possesses specific jurisdictions regarding wind, current, and hydropower generation, artificial islands and facilities, marine environmental protection, and scientific research.

A key difference between the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is that the exclusive economic zone is, as a rule, an area that must be declared. While continental shelf rights arise automatically, the exclusive economic zone is concretized by the declaration of the coastal state or by a delimitation agreement.

Turkey declared an exclusive economic zone extending up to 200 nautical miles in the Black Sea with a decision dated December 5, 1986. Due to the Black Sea's width between opposing coasts being less than 400 nautical miles, Türkiye's area was determined within the framework of delimitation agreements with neighboring states. The boundary previously agreed upon between Turkey and the Soviet Union for the continental shelf was also accepted as the exclusive economic zone boundary through exchanges of notes in 1986 and 1987.

The fact that Türkiye does not have a general and comprehensive exclusive economic zone declaration in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas does not mean that it does not possess continental shelf rights in these areas. However, the need for an exclusive economic zone declaration and delimitation in overlapping areas continues in order to comprehensively utilize fishing and other economic rights in these water bodies.

The Consequences of Türkiye Not Being a Party to the UNCLOS

Turkey has not signed and is not a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Türkiye's main objections include the insufficient consideration given to the unique geography of the Aegean Sea, the extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, the maritime areas of islands, and the inability to make reservations to the Convention. In official statements, Türkiye argues that the Aegean is a unique, semi-enclosed sea with numerous islands; and that applying general rules without considering specific geographical conditions could lead to unfair results.

However, Türkiye's non-participation in the Convention does not mean that it rejects all the rules of maritime law. Many rules, such as territorial waters, innocent passage, continental shelf, freedom of the high seas, and equitable delimitation, are based not only on the Convention but also on international customary law.

Which provision of the UNCLOS is a customary rule must be assessed separately for each provision. The mandatory dispute resolution system established by the Convention for signatory states is not automatically applicable to Turkey. Türkiye cannot be brought before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the mandatory arbitration mechanisms of the UNCLOS against its will. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is also, as a rule, dependent on the consent of the states that are parties to the dispute.

Dispute over Territorial Waters in the Aegean Sea

One of the most important points of contention in the maritime jurisdiction dispute between Turkey and Greece is the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. Both states generally apply a six-nautical-mile territorial water limit in the Aegean. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the maritime border between Türkiye and Greece in the Aegean was not determined by agreement and that delimitation should be based on the presence of reciprocal coastlines.

Greece argues that, based on Article 3 of the UNCLOS, it has the right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. According to Greece's approach, islands, like mainland territory, generate territorial waters, and the right of a coastal state to extend these waters up to 12 miles is part of general international law.

Turkey, on the other hand, argues that due to the numerous Greek islands and islets in the Aegean Sea, a unilateral 12-mile application would transform a large part of the Aegean into Greek territorial waters, severely restricting Türkiye's access to the open sea and the maritime areas of its coasts. According to Türkiye's official assessment, the 12-mile application in the Aegean would cause Greek territorial waters to extend to approximately 70 percent of the sea, while significantly reducing Turkey's access to the open sea.

At the heart of the legal debate is whether the 12-mile maximum width is a unilateral and absolute right, or whether it can be limited within the framework of equity and the prohibition of abuse, taking into account the specific geography of the Aegean and the rights of the other coastal state. UNCLOS recognizes 12 miles as the maximum limit, but stipulates that the delimitation of territorial waters between opposing coasts should, as a rule, be done along the median line or taking into account historical rights and special circumstances. Therefore, the width of territorial waters and the determination of the maritime boundary between two states are related but distinct issues.

Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea

In the Aegean Sea, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone boundaries beyond the territorial waters between Turkey and Greece have not yet been determined by a comprehensive agreement. According to Türkiye's official approach, neither state possesses a delimited maritime jurisdiction area beyond its six-nautical-mile territorial waters.

Greece argues that its islands also constitute a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, and that delimitation should generally be done using the equidistance or median line method. Greece's official position is that the fundamental legal dispute with Turkey concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Greek authorities state that a solution can be found based on UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and, if an agreement cannot be reached, through recourse to international arbitration.

Turkey argues that the geographical location of the Aegean islands, their proximity to the Anatolian coast, the length of the mainland coastline, the fact that the islands are on the opposite side, and the semi-enclosed nature of the sea should be taken into consideration. According to Türkiye, granting automatic full effect to the Greek islands would lead to an unfair delimitation that would block Türkiye's long mainland coastline.

International court decisions do not accept a general rule that islands cannot create maritime zones. According to Article 121 of the UNCLOS, islands suitable for human settlement or independent economic life can, in principle, generate territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone like mainland territory. However, the theoretical creation of maritime area by an island is not the same as the extent to which it will affect the concrete delimitation between opposing coasts. In international court decisions, it is seen that some small, remote islands or islands located in front of the opposing coast are given reduced effect, or sometimes no effect at all, in order to prevent unfair or excessively disproportionate results when delimiting the line. While the general system of the UNCLOS regarding islands subjects islands to the same rules as mainland territory, it also accepts that rocks unsuitable for human settlement or independent economic life cannot create an EEZ and continental shelf.

Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed sea where the distance between opposing coasts is less than 400 nautical miles in many places. Therefore, the claims of coastal states to the 200-mile continental shelf and exclusive economic zone largely overlap. The coasts of Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya can influence delimitation calculations.

The fundamental legal dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean concerns the extent to which Greek islands, particularly those close to the Anatolian coast or located between Turkey and other mainland coasts, generate maritime jurisdiction. Greece argues that the islands have the same rights as mainland territory, including continental shelf and exclusive economic zone rights. Turkey, while not entirely rejecting the idea that islands could, in principle, generate maritime jurisdiction, argues that granting each island equal and full effect with the mainland in delimitation may be equitable.

This distinction needs to be established correctly. There is no general rule in international law stating that "islands have no continental shelf." However, in delimitation proceedings, it is possible to grant islands a reduced influence on the boundary line by considering their location, size, population, and the general geographical features of their coasts. Therefore, the debate is often less about whether an island creates rights and more about how much weight it carries in delimiting conflicting rights.

Türkiye-Libya Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement

A memorandum of understanding regarding the delimitation of maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea was signed between Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Unity on November 27, 2019. The agreement entered into force on December 8, 2019, and was registered with the United Nations Secretariat on December 11, 2019.

The agreement establishes a boundary line between the mainland coasts of Turkey and Libya based on specific coordinates. From Turkey's perspective, the agreement represents the transformation of its view that the mainland coasts in the Eastern Mediterranean are reciprocal and that islands cannot be given an influence that would completely block off the mainland into a concrete delimitation agreement.

Greece argues that the agreement disregards the maritime jurisdiction of Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes, and surrounding Greek islands, that there is no uninterrupted reciprocal coastal relationship between Turkey and Libya, and that the agreement violates the rights of third states. Greece has also submitted these objections to the United Nations.

Registration of a treaty under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter ensures the international record of the treaty's existence and text. However, registration does not mean that the United Nations has approved the legality of all the substantive provisions of the treaty with respect to third states. Whether the Turkey-Libya agreement has legal effect between the parties and whether it can be enforced against Greece or another third state are separate issues. According to the general principles of treaty law, a bilateral agreement cannot eliminate the existing rights of a third state without its consent.

Therefore, when assessing the definitive legal effect of the agreement, the reciprocity of the Turkish and Libyan coastlines, the influence of the intervening Greek islands on the delimitation, equity, proportionality, and the rights of third states must be examined together.

Controversies Surrounding the Island of Cyprus

The maritime jurisdiction issue around Cyprus is not merely a technical matter of maritime delimitation. The political dispute on the island directly affects who can use the maritime areas and on whose behalf.

The Republic of Cyprus, as a state party to the UNCLOS, declares an exclusive economic zone on behalf of the entire island and concludes delimitation agreements with neighboring states. Turkey, however, does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the government representing the entire island; it argues that the Turkish Cypriot people have equal and fundamental rights to the island's natural resources. Türkiye's official stance is that unilateral hydrocarbon activities carried out without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots and without revenue sharing are contrary to law and the political balance on the island.

This dispute involves two intertwined legal issues. Firstly, how the maritime boundaries of the island of Cyprus will be delimited with neighboring states. Secondly, how the rights and revenues derived from natural resources in the delimited or claimed areas will be shared between the two communities on the island.

Turkey distinguishes between the areas it considers its own continental shelf and the areas authorized by the Turkish Cypriots. However, since the majority of the international community recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as the internationally recognized state of the island, the claims made by Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus face the issue of international recognition. Conversely, the issue of political recognition does not prevent the Turkish Cypriot community's demands for equitable access to natural resources from being subject to negotiation.

Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Black Sea

The Black Sea is the least disputed region of Türkiye in terms of maritime jurisdiction. Turkey has declared an exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea and has largely determined its boundaries through agreements with coastal states or through the succession of those states.

The Black Sea example demonstrates that maritime jurisdiction areas can be made permanent and secure through agreements between coastal states rather than unilateral maps. The transformation of the continental shelf boundary between Turkey and the Soviet Union into an exclusive economic zone boundary, and the delimitation processes carried out with other coastal states, reveal the applicability of the method of equity and agreement.

It is not easy to directly transfer this model from the Black Sea to the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. This is because the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean have numerous islands, sovereignty disputes, the Cyprus issue, and conflicting multilateral claims. Nevertheless, the Black Sea example shows that a lasting legal outcome can primarily be achieved through negotiation and delimitation agreements.

The Legal Value of Blue Homeland Maps

Maps that have been made public as part of the Blue Homeland initiative illustrate Türkiye's potential or maximum maritime jurisdiction claims. However, a map prepared by a state institution, an academic, or a military expert alone does not constitute an international maritime boundary.

For a map to acquire legal validity, it must establish the state's official legal position, the coordinates must be notified to relevant international organizations, a delimitation agreement must be concluded with neighboring states, or it must be based on a decision by a competent international court or arbitrator. Unilaterally declared coordinates in overlapping areas do not automatically terminate the claims of the other state.

Maps can serve as evidence of state practice and legal claims. However, in delimitation disputes, what is decisive is not the political influence of the map, but rather coastal geography, baselines, coastal lengths, the location of islands, relevant specific circumstances, the prior conduct of the parties, and an equitable outcome.

Therefore, presenting the Blue Homeland maps as "Türkiye's definitive and indisputable maritime borders" is not legally accurate. A more accurate characterization would be that these are claim maps demonstrating Türkiye's legal and strategic arguments regarding its maritime jurisdiction areas. Türkiye's Black Sea borders, finalized by agreement, should be distinguished from the as-yet-undelimited areas in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.

Energy Exploration Activities and Sovereign Rights

The most significant practical consequence of maritime jurisdiction disputes is seen in oil and natural gas exploration activities. A coastal state has the exclusive right to explore and exploit hydrocarbon resources within its continental shelf. This right is not subject to actual use or declaration.

However, unilateral drilling activities in areas where the continental shelf claims of the two states overlap and the boundary has not yet been determined can lead to tension. The general approach in Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS is that until a delimitation agreement is reached, states should strive in good faith for provisional arrangements and refrain from conduct that would jeopardize or hinder the achievement of a final agreement.

Seismic surveys and drilling should not be evaluated with the same intensity. While seismic surveys may be more temporary and have limited effects, drilling results in physical intervention in the seabed and the extraction of natural resources. Therefore, it can be argued that drilling activities in disputed areas may irreversibly affect the rights of the other State.

The most legally secure solution is to establish temporary arrangements, joint development zones, or revenue-sharing mechanisms until the delimitation is completed. This would allow states to jointly benefit from natural resources without relinquishing their sovereignty and border claims.

Peaceful Delimitation of Maritime Zones

The primary method for resolving maritime issues between Türkiye and Greece is negotiation. If an agreement cannot be reached through negotiations, the parties may enter into a joint arbitration agreement or refer specific legal questions to the International Court of Justice through a special agreement.

For recourse to international arbitration to be possible, the scope of the dispute must be carefully defined. Greece argues that the fundamental dispute concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. Turkey, on the other hand, states that there are multiple related issues in the Aegean Sea, including territorial waters, airspace, sovereignty over certain geographical formations, demilitarization of islands, and search and rescue zones.

This difference makes it difficult to determine which issue will be presented to the court. If only the continental shelf and EEZ delimitation are considered, the question may arise as to which state's coastline the disputed geographical formations belong to in the delimitation. Therefore, the parties must first agree on the scope of the disputes and which issues are suitable for judicial resolution.

An international court ruling may not resolve all political issues for the parties; however, the delimitation of maritime boundaries can significantly enhance legal certainty in terms of energy, fisheries, and scientific research. During the negotiation process, temporary arrangements such as joint energy projects, the freezing of reciprocal licenses, notification of research activities, and military measures to reduce tension can also be implemented.

Legal Criticisms Directed at the Blue Homeland Doctrine

One of the main criticisms of the Blue Homeland doctrine is the claim that some maps excessively delimit or completely disregard the maritime areas of Greek islands. Greece argues that Türkiye's approach is incompatible with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which recognize islands as having the same maritime areas as the mainland. In maps and statements published by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Blue Homeland approach is characterized as an expansionist claim that violates the maritime jurisdiction of Greek islands.

Turkey, in response to these criticisms, argues that its position is not that the islands should have no maritime rights whatsoever, but rather that they should be given equitable effect in the delimitation process. According to Türkiye, granting full effect to small islands very close to the Anatolian coast would create a disproportionate result, confining Türkiye's thousands of kilometers of coastline to a narrow maritime area.

Legally, neither approach should be absolutized. The mechanistic approach that all islands should have equal influence with the mainland in all cases does not fully align with international delimitation jurisprudence. Conversely, an approach that categorically denies the existence of islands or their capacity to generate maritime area is also incompatible with general rules of maritime law.

Another criticism is that the term "Blue Homeland" portrays the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone as areas of national sovereignty. Legally, Türkiye does not possess sovereignty in these areas, but rather sovereign rights with respect to natural resources and specific activities. Therefore, broad expressions used in domestic political or strategic contexts should not be confused with the technical legal status.

Türkiye's Legal Strategy Regarding its Maritime Jurisdiction Areas

To strengthen its rights in maritime jurisdiction areas, Türkiye primarily needs a transparent and comprehensive domestic legal system that is consistent with international law. While Türkiye has regulations regarding territorial waters and the Black Sea exclusive economic zone, it lacks a comprehensive Maritime Jurisdiction Law that brings together the regimes of internal waters, baselines, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones in different seas in a single text.

Secondly, Türkiye needs to increase its bilateral delimitation agreements with coastal states. While the demarcation of maritime areas with maps is an important state practice, lasting legal security in overlapping areas can primarily be achieved through agreements.

Thirdly, maritime jurisdiction arguments must be supported not only by security discourse but also by international court jurisprudence, coastal geography, proportionality, and equity analyses. Each delimitation has different geographical characteristics. It is not advisable to directly apply a single sentence from a court decision concerning another maritime area to the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean.

Fourthly, temporary joint mechanisms protecting the rights of both communities with respect to natural resources around Cyprus can be supported. Holding revenues in a joint fund, establishing mutual representation and decision-making mechanisms, without waiting for a final political solution, could reduce the economic tensions stemming from the conflict.

Finally, the protection of maritime zones is not solely dependent on military capacity. Scientific marine research, hydrographic surveys, environmental policy, fisheries management, maritime trade, ports, submarine cables, and energy technologies are also elements of an effective state presence at sea.

Conclusion

Blue Homeland is a strategic doctrine that encompasses all of Türkiye's rights and interests in the seas surrounding it. However, the concept is not an independent maritime jurisdiction area in international law. Türkiye's legal rights in the seas are based on established legal institutions such as internal waters, territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone.

Turkey exercises sovereignty over its internal and territorial waters, and sovereign rights over natural resources and specific activities in its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. Maintaining the distinction between these areas is crucial for the legal legitimacy of the Blue Homeland approach.

While borders in the Black Sea have been largely determined by agreements, conflicting claims persist in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. In the Aegean, key issues include the extent of territorial waters, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and the influence of islands; in the Eastern Mediterranean, the island-mainland relationship, the Turkey-Libya agreement, and resources around Cyprus are the primary areas of dispute.

While international law acknowledges that islands can, in principle, generate maritime area, it does not mandate that each island be granted full effect in delimitation in every case. The ultimate goal is to reach an equitable outcome, taking into account coastal geography and relevant specific circumstances. Therefore, Türkiye's argument that its mainland coasts cannot be ignored may find support in international jurisprudence; however, this argument cannot be applied in a way that completely disregards all rights of the islands on the opposite coast.

The defensibility of the Blue Homeland doctrine under international law is possible not through maximal political claims, but through measured coordinates, technical coastal analyses, international jurisprudence, provisional cooperation arrangements, and equitable delimitation agreements with coastal states. The permanent protection of maritime zones can only be achieved through legal predictability and diplomatic legitimacy, not solely through the use of force.