Autonomous Ships and Legal Responsibility: An Examination from the Perspective of Maritime Trade Law and International Maritime Law

Entrance

Advances in artificial intelligence, sensor technologies, satellite communication, machine learning, and remote control systems are significantly changing the traditional understanding of ship management in maritime transport. Alongside the classic ship model with a captain and crew on the bridge, ships are being developed that automatically perform specific navigation and operational tasks, are managed from a land-based center, or operate completely autonomously. These ships are referred to internationally as "Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – MASS," and in Turkish, generally as "autonomous surface ships" or "autonomous vessels.".

Autonomous ships are not merely a technical innovation. The fact that the ship's navigation and management are carried out by software, algorithms, sensors, and a remote operations center instead of humans necessitates a reassessment of the liability relationships between the captain, owner, carrier, ship operating contractor, software manufacturer, ship manufacturer, classification society, and insurers. In traditional maritime law, liability is largely based on the actions of the captain, crew, and owner. However, in the event of a collision caused by an autonomous ship, determining whether the fault lies with the captain, the remote operator, the sensor manufacturer, the software developer, or with organizational deficiencies on the part of the ship operator can be quite difficult.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines an autonomous ship as one that can operate independently of human interaction to varying degrees. In its initial classification in 2018, the IMO considered ships with crew on board but using automated processes and decision support systems, ships with crew on board but remotely controlled from another location, ships without crew on board but remotely controlled, and ships operating fully autonomously by making their own decisions as separate models. However, it is also acknowledged that the same ship can operate at different levels of autonomy during a single voyage.

The Ship Characteristics of Autonomous Ships

It must first be determined whether an autonomous marine vessel is legally considered a "ship." According to Article 931 of the Turkish Commercial Code, any vessel that is designed for a purpose requiring movement in water, possesses buoyancy, and is not excessively small, is considered a ship, even if it lacks the ability to move independently. The second paragraph of the same article stipulates that ships dedicated to or actually used for the purpose of generating economic benefit in water are considered commercial vessels.

This definition does not require the vessel to be operated by humans, to have a captain on board, or to have a specific crew. Therefore, an autonomous marine vessel capable of floating, moving in water, and used for economic purposes can be considered a ship and a merchant vessel within the meaning of the Turkish Commercial Code. The fact that the vessel is managed by artificial intelligence or controlled from land does not, in itself, negate its status as a ship.

Therefore, the main legal issue regarding autonomous vessels is not so much whether these vehicles should be considered vessels, but rather how existing maritime trade law provisions apply to unmanned or remotely controlled operations. Although the definition of a vessel in the Turkish Commercial Code is broad enough in terms of technology, many regulations such as captain, crew, watchkeeping, ship's logbook, marine report, and keeping documents on board are drafted based on the people physically present on the vessel.

IMO MASS Code and International Regulations

In its regulatory scope review completed in 2021, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) investigated potential gaps in the application of existing international maritime rules to autonomous vessels. The review identified a need to assess numerous international regulations, including SOLAS, COLREG, STCW, the ISM Code, search and rescue regulations, ship tonnage, load limits, maritime safety, and ship certification, from the perspective of autonomous vessels.

As a result of these studies, the International Autonomous Surface Vessels Safety Code was adopted at the 111th meeting of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in May 2026. The MASS Code, adopted by resolution MSC.595(111), entered into force on 1 July 2026. However, the Code is currently a non-binding regulation. It mainly applies to cargo ships engaged in international voyages under SOLAS Chapter I; it is recommended that it be applied to autonomous vessels under 500 gross tons as far as possible.

The MASS Code adopts a goal-oriented and technology-neutral system aimed at ensuring that autonomous and remotely controlled vessels provide a level of safety, security, and environmental protection equivalent to that of conventional vessels. The code regulates aspects such as vessel design, construction, navigation, communication links, fire safety, search and rescue capabilities, remote operations center, cybersecurity, risk assessment, and certification. It must be predetermined in which operating modes the autonomous vessel can be used, in which sea and weather conditions it can operate safely, and how it should act if it exceeds defined safety limits.

One of the most important choices in the code is that it does not completely eliminate the human element. According to IMO regulations, the captain retains overall responsibility for the ship even if he is not physically on board. It is necessary that personnel working in remote operations centers are trained and authorized, that these centers are supervised, and that they operate within a robust Safety Management System.

The goal is to begin development of the binding MASS Code in 2028, have it adopted by July 1, 2030, and bring it into effect on January 1, 2032. Experience gained through implementation by these dates will be used to define the scope of binding regulations.

The Concept of Captain and the Legal Status of the Remote Captain

According to Article 1088 of the Turkish Commercial Code, the captain is obliged to act as a prudent captain in all his duties, and especially in the fulfillment of the contracts assigned to him. According to Article 1089 of the same code, the captain is liable to the ship, cargo, passengers, and other interested parties for damages caused by his negligence. Obedience to the shipowner's order does not absolve the captain of responsibility; the shipowner who knowingly gave the order is also held liable for the resulting damage. Furthermore, the captain is obliged to inspect the ship for seaworthiness and roadworthiness before setting sail.

Whether the captain must necessarily be physically present on autonomous vessels is debatable. A significant portion of the current Turkish Commercial Code provisions are based on the assumption that the captain is physically on board. Tasks such as keeping documents on board, maintaining the ship's logbook, preparing the maritime report, supervising loading and unloading, and conducting transactions on behalf of the shipowner are regulated based on the premise of a physical captain's presence.

In contrast, the MASS Code explicitly acknowledges that the captain may be located outside the ship. Thus, a person working at a remote operations center on shore and responsible for the overall navigation and management of the ship can be considered a "remote captain." However, whether this person is a captain in the classical sense, a remote operator, an employee of the ship's management, or a separate service provider must be clearly defined in national law.

In Turkish law, the requirement for the captain to be physically present on board can be overcome through a functional interpretation. The title of captain could be linked not to the individual's physical location, but to the decision-making authority they possess over the overall navigation and management of the ship. However, issues such as criminal liability, administrative sanctions, working and rest periods, qualification certificates, the number of ships a single person can control, and to whom authority passes in the event of a loss of contact with the ship, need to be determined through specific regulations.

The Issue of Recognizing Remote Operators as Seafarers

Article 934 of the Turkish Commercial Code defines seafarers as captains, ship officers, crew members, and other persons employed on board the ship. The use of the phrase "persons employed on board the ship" in this definition makes it difficult to directly consider operators working in remote operations centers on land as seafarers.

The fact that a remote operator is not considered a seafarer is particularly important in terms of the shipowner's liability. This is because Article 1062 of the Turkish Commercial Code regulates the shipowner's liability for damages arising from the faults of seafarers and pilots in the performance of their duties. If a remote operator is deemed not a seafarer, the direct application of this provision becomes debatable.

In contrast, there is a broader regulation regarding the carrier's liability. Article 1179 of the Turkish Commercial Code states that the concept of "carrier's agents" includes, in addition to seafarers, persons working for the transportation company, persons authorized to represent the carrier, and other persons used in the performance of the freight contract. Therefore, a person working in a remote operations center can be considered an agent of the carrier, even if they are not considered a seafarer.

Future regulations should clearly define the legal status of roles such as remote captain, remote operator, system supervisor, connectivity officer, and autonomous systems specialist. Otherwise, the same person's roles as captain, seaman, worker, and service provider could be evaluated differently depending on the specific case.

Legal Responsibility of the Shipowner

According to Article 1061 of the Turkish Commercial Code, the shipowner is the owner of a ship who uses it for profit. A person who uses a ship that does not belong to them for their own benefit is also considered the shipowner in their relations with third parties. The fact that an autonomous ship is steered by artificial intelligence does not negate the shipowner status of the person operating the ship for economic gain.

According to Article 1062 of the Turkish Commercial Code, the shipowner is liable for damages caused to third parties as a result of faults committed by crew members and pilots while performing their duties. In autonomous vessels, however, the damage may arise not from human behavior but from algorithmic decisions, sensor failures, communication interruptions, or software errors. In this case, attributing liability solely to the fault of the crew may not be sufficient.

The operator's failure to verify the reliability of the autonomous system before commissioning, to perform necessary updates, to establish a backup connection system, to have sufficient and qualified personnel in the remote operations center, or to operate the vessel outside of safe operating limits, may constitute a direct organizational fault. In such a case, liability may rest not only on the personal error of the remote operator but also on the operator's own operational and supervisory shortcomings.

The MASS Code places particular emphasis on risk assessment, robust system design, cybersecurity, connectivity continuity, and the definition of safe operating boundaries, thus expanding the scope of the shipowner's duty of care. It will not be sufficient for the autonomous vessel operator to simply perform mechanical maintenance; software updates, data accuracy, sensor calibration, algorithm testing, the adequacy of the remote operations center, and protection against cyberattacks will also become part of seaworthiness and safe operation.

Collision Responsibility and Autonomous Decisions

One of the most important areas of responsibility for autonomous vessels is collisions. According to Article 1286 of the Turkish Commercial Code, damages to ships, people, or property resulting from a collision between two or more ships are subject to collision regulations. Furthermore, even if a physical collision does not occur, collision regulations apply if one ship causes damage to another due to maneuvering, failure to maneuver, or failure to comply with navigation rules.

If a collision is caused by the fault of a ship's owner or crew, the ship's owner shall compensate for the damage. If more than one ship is at fault, the owners shall be held liable in proportion to the severity of their fault. If the degree of fault cannot be determined, or if the parties are equally at fault, the liability shall be shared equally.

In the case of a collision involving an autonomous vessel, fault assessment will be more complex than in classic maritime accidents. For example, the ship's sensors may have detected the other vessel in time, but the algorithm may have made an incorrect avoidance maneuver. In another incident, the sensor may have worked correctly, but the operator on land may have reacted too late to the maneuver suggested by the system. Disconnected satellite communication, outdated chart data, GPS signal interference, or a cyberattack can also lead to the accident.

The COLREG (Collision at Sea Regulations) of 1972, which is a regulation for preventing collisions at sea, applies to all vessels on the high seas and in waters where seafaring vessels can navigate. COLREG Rule 5 requires every vessel to exercise effective lookout by sight, hearing, and all available appropriate means; Rule 6 requires it to navigate at a safe speed; Rule 7 requires it to utilize all available means to identify the risk of collision; and Rule 8 requires it to take timely and effective action to avoid a collision.

These rules also apply to autonomous vessels. Whether camera, radar, lidar, sonar, and AI-based image processing systems provide legally sound “adequate surveillance” must be assessed based on the specific capabilities of the system. A system's ability to collect more data than the human eye is not sufficient on its own. The system must be able to reliably interpret the movements of other vessels, sea conditions, and unusual behavior.

In collision cases, the ship's data records will be of paramount importance. Sensor logs, algorithm decisions, software version, operator interventions, connection interruptions, remote operation center logs, and system alerts will be key evidence in determining fault. Therefore, it should be mandatory for autonomous ships to maintain immutable and time-stamped electronic records.

Seaworthiness and Carrier's Liability

According to Article 932 of the Turkish Commercial Code, a ship is considered seaworthy if its hull, general outfitting, and essential components are capable of withstanding the dangers of the voyage. The ship's organization, loading condition, fuel, provisions, and the competence and number of crew members are also considered seaworthy in terms of their ability to withstand the dangers of the voyage.

For autonomous vessels, the concept of seaworthiness and voyage cannot be limited solely to the hull, machinery, and mechanical equipment. Autonomous navigation software, sensors, communication infrastructure, remote control system, backup power sources, cybersecurity measures, and emergency systems are also essential elements for the vessel to navigate safely. A vessel with a known error in its critical software or that cannot return to a safe state in the event of a connection loss may be considered voyage-unfit, even if it is physically sound.

Article 1141 of the Turkish Commercial Code imposes on the carrier the obligation to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy, transit-worthy, and cargo-worthy condition in all types of freight contracts. The carrier is liable for damages arising from unsuitability, except for deficiencies that could not be detected before the start of the voyage despite the carrier exercising the care and diligence expected of a prudent carrier.

In this context, damage to the cargo due to insufficient testing of the autonomous system, failure to perform software updates, failure to calibrate sensors, failure to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities, or an inadequate remote operations center may lead to claims that the carrier has breached its duty of suitability. The carrier's reliance solely on the system manufacturer's certification may not be sufficient to absolve it of liability in every instance. A prudent carrier is expected to monitor the system throughout its service life and take necessary precautions against known risks.

The carrier is also obliged to exercise the care and diligence expected of a prudent carrier in loading, stowage, transportation, protection, supervision, and unloading of the goods. The use of autonomous loading systems, robotic cranes, or AI-powered cargo tracking systems does not relieve the carrier of this fundamental obligation.

Software Manufacturer, Ship Manufacturer and Technology Provider Responsibility

In autonomous vessels, damage may not only result from the actions of the ship's operator or the remote operator. Faulty software design, defective sensor manufacturing, an algorithm making an incorrect decision in a foreseeable situation, or the failure to provide update services in a timely manner can also cause accidents.

In this situation, the contractual liability of the software developer, system manufacturer, hardware supplier, and ship manufacturer may arise. The contract between the shipowner and the technology provider should clearly regulate performance metrics, software update obligations, cybersecurity standards, system outages, data ownership, liability limits, and recourse provisions regarding third-party claims.

In cases where third parties suffer harm, in addition to general tort provisions, Law No. 7223 on Product Safety and Technical Regulations should also be considered. This law aims to ensure the safety of products placed on the market or offered as services; it accepts the liability of manufacturers and importers for compensation to the injured party in cases of death, injury, or damage to property caused by unsafe products.

However, whether independent software constitutes a product, whether the decisions made by an artificial intelligence system through subsequent learning can be considered a manufacturing defect, and how the relationship between specific maritime trade liability regimes and product liability should be established, must be examined on a case-by-case basis. For autonomous vessels, regulating manufacturer liability to explicitly cover software and algorithms will increase legal certainty.

Classification societies and certification bodies also inspect the technical conformity of ships and systems. However, the possession of a classification certificate does not automatically absolve the shipowner or carrier of responsibility. The liability of a classification society is determined by considering its contractual duties, the scope of inspection, the severity of the fault, the causal link to the damage, and whether the injured party is a party to the contract.

Cybersecurity and Disruptions

Because autonomous ships rely on continuous data exchange and digital connectivity, cyberattacks can have more severe consequences compared to conventional ships. GPS spoofing, interruption of communication, remote hijacking of the ship, alteration of sensor data, or manipulation of cargo information can lead to collisions, groundings, environmental pollution, and cargo loss.

The ISM Code establishes an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and the prevention of pollution; it requires shipping companies to assess identified risks and establish appropriate protective measures. The IMO also mandates that maritime cyber risks be addressed within Safety Management Systems. The MASS Code, meanwhile, places particular emphasis on connection security, system resilience, cybersecurity, and the safety management of remote operations centers.

Even if a cyberattack originates from the actions of a third party, the provider or carrier is not automatically absolved of responsibility. It must be examined whether the business has taken reasonable security measures against foreseeable threats, whether it has patched system vulnerabilities in a timely manner, and whether it has established backup connections and manual intervention capabilities. If a known security vulnerability is not addressed, it will be difficult to argue that the causal link between the attack and the resulting damage has been completely severed.

Limitation of Liability and Insurance

In maritime law, shipowners, captains, and other responsible parties may limit their liability for certain maritime claims. Article 1328 of the Turkish Commercial Code stipulates that liability arising from maritime claims may be limited in accordance with the provisions of the 1976 Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims and its 1996 Protocol. This regime also applies to cases that do not involve a foreign element.

Collisions, loss of life, injury, or property damage resulting from autonomous vessels may also be subject to the limitation of liability regime, depending on their nature. However, the right to limitation may be lost if the damage is caused by the responsible party's personal actions, with the intention of causing the damage, or recklessly knowing that the damage will occur.

From an insurance perspective, classic hull and machinery insurance policies, along with P&I club coverage, must explicitly cover autonomous system risks. Software failures, cyberattacks, data loss, connection interruptions, remote operation center malfunctions, and product liability may not be fully covered in traditional policy texts. Therefore, in autonomous vessel projects, it is important to consider hull insurance, P&I coverage, cyber risk insurance, professional liability insurance, and product liability insurance together.

Proof and Electronic Evidence

Determining legal responsibility in autonomous ship accidents will largely rely on electronic data. While in traditional accidents, statements from the captain and crew, ship logs, radar records, and voyage documents are examined, in autonomous ships, the algorithm's decision history, sensor data, camera images, software versions, update records, operator commands, and system alerts will be decisive.

Specifically, it must be regulated who will store this data, for how long it will be retained, which parties will have access to the data, and how it will be proven that the data has not been altered. Records controlled solely by the provider or software manufacturer can create significant difficulties in proving the damages for the injured party. Courts should be able to order the submission of data if necessary, the deletion of data after an incident should be prevented, and critical records should be stored in an independent system.

Closing the algorithm to scrutiny on the grounds that it is a trade secret could also create problems in terms of the right to a fair trial and the right to prove fault. A balanced procedural system must be established between the protection of trade secrets and the right of those harmed to prove fault.

The Need for Regulation from the Perspective of Turkish Law

The broad definition of a ship in the Turkish Commercial Code is generally conducive to including autonomous vessels within the scope of maritime trade law. However, provisions regarding captaincy, crew, the owner's liability for auxiliary personnel, seaworthiness, watchkeeping, ship's logbook, marine report, and onboard documentation should be updated to reflect the specific characteristics of autonomous vessels.

The licensing of remote operation centers, the training and qualification requirements for remote captains and operators, the number of vessels an operator can control simultaneously, the emergency procedure to be followed in case of connection loss, the certification of autonomous systems, software updates, and the storage of electronic records must be clearly regulated.

Furthermore, instead of attributing responsibility to a single individual, it should be distributed according to the roles and faults of the actors contributing to the accident. The shipowner's operational and organizational failures, the remote operator's navigational error, the manufacturer's product defect, and the software developer's breach of update obligations can all coexist in the same incident. Therefore, a multi-layered liability system should be established that protects the injured party but is also predictable for technology manufacturers and shipping companies.

Conclusion

Autonomous ships, rather than completely eliminating the human element in maritime transport, transfer human tasks and responsibilities from the ship to land-based operation centers and technological systems. Therefore, the fundamental legal issue is not whether artificial intelligence can be held accountable, but rather how responsibility should be shared among those who design, operate, supervise, and profit economically from the AI.

The current provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code largely allow autonomous vessels to be considered as ships and merchant vessels; and the provisions regarding collision, carriage, seaworthiness, and limitation of liability apply to these vessels. However, significant gaps remain regarding the status of the remote captain, whether shore-based operators should be considered seafarers, the role of algorithmic decisions in fault assessment, and the liability of software manufacturers.

The non-binding IMO MASS Code, which entered into force on July 1, 2026, is an important starting point for addressing these gaps. The Code sets out fundamental principles such as equivalent safety levels to conventional ships, preservation of human oversight, risk assessment, cybersecurity, and supervision of remote operation centers. However, for international regulations to be effective, these principles need to be incorporated into Turkish maritime trade legislation, and detailed rules need to be prepared regarding the operation of autonomous vessels in Turkish ports, Turkish territorial waters, and under the Turkish flag.

In the future of maritime law, liability will move away from the traditional structure that focuses solely on the captain's navigational errors. The shipowner's organizational obligations, the carrier's digital seaworthiness liability, the manufacturer's product safety liability, the software developer's update liability, and the remote operator's intervention liability will all be considered together. The fundamental aim of the law should be to ensure the safety of life, property, and the environment at sea without hindering technological development; and at the same time, to guarantee that those who have suffered damage have access to an effective compensation system.